The interest rates and performance of MFIs in the MENA region: is there a moral issue? by Adair, Philippe & Berguiga, Imène
 Éthique et économique/Ethics and Economics, 12 (2), 2015   
http://ethique-economique.net/ 
 
 
 
 
The interest rates and performance of MFIs in 
the MENA region: is there a moral issue? 
 
By/Par     Philippe Adair1 Imène Berguiga2   
1. Université Paris-Est Créteil, ERUDITE, Faculty of Economics and Management, 
adair@u-pec.fr 
2. Université de Sousse, ERUDITE and IHEC, Tunisia, imne068@yahoo.fr 
   
ABSTRACT 
The high interest rates of microfinance institutions (MFIs) seem to oppose their social 
mission, and raise a moral issue. We analyse the determinants of the level of interest rates 
with regard to the financial performance of an unbalanced panel of 66 MFIs in nine countries 
of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region over the period 2004-2012. We 
differentiate internal factors (cost of capital, operating expenses and loss provisions) from 
the external ones (regulation, competition and inflation).The outcomes of a typology from a 
multivariate analysis upon the relationship between the interest rate and social performance 
of 53 MFIs in 2008 do not match the classification of MFIs according to Yunus and Weber, 
which proves irrelevant. 
Keywords: costs, interest rates, MENA, microfinance institutions, multivariate analysis, 
performance. 
RÉSUMÉ 
Le taux d’intérêt élevé des institutions de microfinance (IMF) semble s’opposer à la mission 
sociale du microcrédit. Nous analysons les déterminants des niveaux des taux d’intérêt au 
regard de la performance financière d’un panel incomplet de 66 IMF dans 9 pays de la 
région du Moyen-Orient et d’Afrique du Nord (MENA) sur la période 2004-2012. Nous 
distinguons les facteurs internes (coût des fonds propres, charges d’exploitation, provisions 
pour pertes) et externes (règlementation, concurrence et inflation). Nous confrontons la 
typologie d’une analyse factorielle sur la relation entre taux d’intérêt et performance sociale 
de 53 IMF de la région en 2008 au classement des IMF selon Yunus & Weber, dont le critère 
de la marge financière s’avère non pertinent.  
Mots clés : analyse factorielle, coûts, institutions de microfinance, MENA, performance, 
taux d’intérêt. 
 
 JEL: C13, C33, D23, G21, I3 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) provide financing to the poor excluded from bank credit 
and stand as an alternative to usury requested by informal lenders. The lending rates charged 
by MFIs to their borrowers stand in between the bank rate and usury.  
The lending interest rates should enable MFIs to provide sustainable financial services to 
large numbers of poor clients while being independent of any form of subsidy (CGAP, 
1997). They must therefore access commercial funds involving a payable rate and achieve a 
financial margin sufficient to offset all direct and indirect costs associated with their 
financial intermediation (Labie, 1996). 
Although MFI interest rates are lower than in informal finance, they are considered too high 
with regard to poor clients. From the ethical point of view, high rates undermine the social 
acceptance of microfinance, generating the disapproval of international political leaders 
(CGAP, 2004; Fernando, 2006; Hudon, 2007; Gonzalez, 2010). The controversy between the 
advocates of free (and high) lending rates and those of capped rates took place at the very 
beginning of microfinance in the 1970s (Acclassato, 2008). It was revived by a strong 
criticism from the founder of the Grameen Bank (Yunus and Weber, 2007) and fuelled the 
discussion on the regulatory ceiling upon interest rates in a growing number of countries. 
Three main schools of thought participate in the debate upon the appropriate level of 
microfinance lending rates: the first two fall under the welfarist approach that opposes the 
institutionalist approach of the third school (Adair and Berguiga, 2014). The theological 
school consists mainly in Christian NGOs, according to which any interest rate equates 
prohibited usury, advocating near-zero rates. The second school claims that interest rates 
should be capped below the market rate (Helms and Reille, 2004); it gathers savings and 
credit unions and mutual societies as well as federations and unions of the Raiffeisen type. 
The third school supports MFIs opting for the sustainability of their business, which cover up 
their costs and reinvest their profit, thanks to high interest rates their clients cope with 
(Ayayi and Sene, 2010). Several studies (CGAP, 1997; Ledgerwood, 1998; Hudon, 2007; 
Gonzalez, 2010; Cotler and Almazan, 2013) have proposed models of determination of fair 
lending interest rates, albeit these models ignore the external factors influencing the rate 
levels. 
With respect to worldwide microfinance, the MENA region is both the most recent and the 
narrowest market, in terms of the number of customers and loan portfolio, and the one whose 
growth is fastest (MIX & Sanabel, 2012). According to MIX & Sanabel (2011), MFIs charge 
a 19.69% interest rate per annum on average. This rate varies across countries and over time: 
where comes from the difference between lending rates? What are the determinants of 
interest rates in the MENA region? Are these interest rates undermining social performance 
and forsaking poor clients who represent the target of MFIs? 
The first section describes the level and evolution of both debtor and creditor interest rates 
for a sample of 66 MFIs in nine countries from the MENA region over the period 2004-
2011. The second section examines the internal components of interest rates: capital costs, 
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operating expenses and loan losses. The third section focuses upon the relationship between 
interest rates and social performance of 53 MFIs; it confronts the classification resulting 
from a multivariate analysis with the classification advocated by Mohamed Yunus. The 
fourth section takes into account the external factors influencing the MFI interest rates: 
regulation, competition and inflation. The conclusion summarizes our main results. 
1. THE SOURCES, LEVELS AND TRENDS OF MICROFINANCE INTEREST RATES IN 
THE MENA REGION 
 
1.1. Data sources 
Thanks to the Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) database, we selected an 
incomplete panel of 66 MFIs in nine countries in the MENA region over the period 2004-
2011: Egypt (13), Jordan (8), Morocco (10), Tunisia (1), Yemen (7), Lebanon (5), Palestine 
(8), Syria (3) and Iraq (11). 
The MIX provides the average lending rate per annum in nominal terms, expressing the total 
loans income (interest, commissions and other costs) as a percentage of the outstanding 
amount of the gross loan portfolio. This database also collects information on financial 
expenses and debts: i.e. the cost of resources used by MFIs to finance their loan portfolio; 
hence, the nominal borrowing rate can be calculated by dividing the total financial expenses 
upon total liabilities (savings deposits, trade payables and payables to subsidized rate) 
(Appendix 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. The trends of interest rates in the MENA region (2004-2012) 
 
Source: our design from the MIX 
 
1.2. Levels and change in lending rates 
The median lending rate of interest for MENA MFIs varies between 29% and 36% over the 
2004-2012 period (Figure 1) and half of MFI applies a rate of 30% in 2012. These rates 
decline until 2009 and then stabilize until 2012; however, they diverge according to the 
country over the period (Figure 2). Levels fall gradually in Morocco, Yemen, Palestine and 
Tunisia: Yemeni MFIs recorded the highest median interest rates in the MENA region, 48% 
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in 2004 and 39.4% in 2012; the rate of the Tunisian MFI went down from 50% in 2004 to 
20.21% in 2011.In contrast, rates rise in Egypt, Jordan, Iraq and Syria. The MENA MFIs 
differ according to their stage of development: those of Egypt and Jordan are mature (over 
eight years old), while those of Iraq and Syria are the youngest (Appendix 2). The increase in 
lending rate in these countries therefore requires further explanation than age. 
 
 
Figure 2. The trends of lending interest rates across MENA countries (2004-2012) 
 
Legend: data are median rates. 
Source: our design from the MIX 
 
1.3. The levels and trends of borrowing interest rates  
The median payable rates of interest of the MENA MFIs averaged 2% in 2004 up to 5.22% 
in 2012 (Figure 1). The trend over the 2004-2012 period is mixed across countries (Figure 
3). Rising interest rates can be explained by the maturity of microfinance in Morocco, 
including MFIs receive the majority of funding for the region; the increased indebtedness of 
MFIs in Jordan and Yemen reinforces the leverage between 2007 and 2008 (MIX & Sanabel, 
2010).  
Conversely, the lower rates for MFIs in Egypt can be explained by the ease of access to 
preferential borrowing rates; in 2008, the cost of resources used by MFIs in Egypt and 
Lebanon declined significantly compared to 2004 and 2011.The Tunisian MFI records the 
highest cost of resources (7.32%). MFIs in Palestine and Iraq are not mature enough to raise 
funds from banks without the help of credit guarantees (MIX & Sanabel, 2010). The increase 
in payable rates does not explain he decline in lending rates until 2007: the more MFIs pay 
interest charges on their borrowed funds, the less the return on their portfolio, and vice versa. 
However, both rates follow the same trend since 2008. 
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Figure 3. The trends of borrowing interest rates across MENA countries 
(2004-2012) 
 
Legend: data are median rates. 
Source: our design from the MIX 
 
2. COMPONENTS OF THE LENDING RATE IN THE MENA REGION 
 
The excess (or negative) between income and expenses is ready profits (or losses) of the 
MFI. The components of lending rates cover three broad headings: financial expenses, 
provisions for non-performing loans and operating expenses (Box 1). The increase or 
decrease in one or more components generates a rise or decline in the lending rate 
(Rosenberg et al, 2013). 
 
 
Box 1. Components of the lending interest rate 
Lending rate = (financial expenses /AGLP) + (loan loss provision /AGLP) + 
Operating expenses/AGLP) + (profit /AGLP) 
Lending rate ratio = financial expense ratio + loan loss provision ratio 
+operating expense ratio + net profit ratio 
Payable interest rate = Financial revenue /AGLP 
AGLP = Average Gross Loan Portfolio 
Source: our design 
 
The lending rate in the MENA region is one of the lowest in the world and the ratio of total 
expenses to total assets is the lowest compared to other regions (MIX & Sanabel, 2010). 
According to the breakdown of these costs in 2008, the ratio of operating expenses is the 
major component in the structure of costs for MENA MFIs. Moreover, profitability is not the 
main determinant of lending rates (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4. Components of the lending interest rate across countries (2008) 
Source: our design from the MIX 
 
2.1. Financial expenses 
MFIs use three funding sources: equity, debt and the deposits. Equity, including subsidies, 
was the main source. Since the donors restricted their commitments in the MENA region, 
MFIs did raise loans from private investors (Figure 5). Debts are now the primary source, 
followed by subsidies and credit guarantees. 
 
Figure 5. The funding sources of the MENA MFIs (2007-2011) 
 
Source: our design from the MIX 
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The evolution of the debt to equity ratio (leverage) shows that MFIs from Morocco, Jordan, 
Yemen and Tunisia are mainly financed with debt, including voluntary savings (Figure 6). 
The Moroccan MFIs have access to commercial debt without any credit guarantee, thanks to 
the maturity, size and performance of microfinance in the country. MFIs from Jordan, 
Yemen and Tunisia are mature compared to those of the young emerging markets of 
Lebanon, Palestine, Syria and Iraq (Appendix 2). In Jordan, MFIs increased their median 
leverage from 0.2 to 1.8 between 2004 and 2012, while the leverage of MFIs in emerging 
markets is less than 1. Debts amount to half the equity of Egyptian MFIs, which still depend 
on credit guarantees to access commercial loans (MIX & Sanabel, 2010). 
 
Figure 6.The debt to equity ratio of MFIs per country (2004-2012) 
 
Source: our design from the MIX 
 
Generally, the more MFIs are indebted, the more they pay high financial expenses, unless 
they benefit from subsidies or concessional rates. The level of median financial costs 
incurred by Moroccan MFIs (5% in 2008) is lower than that in Egypt (7.01%) and Yemen 
(6.08%) (Figure 4). In Yemen and Syria, the collection of voluntary savings also increases 
financial expenses. 
Various donors finance MFIs: domestic financial institutions (commercial, public and 
cooperative banks), development finance institutions (DFIs), funds (microfinance investment 
vehicles, funds from international NGOs and foundations) and governments as well as other 
providers (NGOs, individuals and private companies). Domestic financial institutions are the 
main lender of MENA MFIs providing 81.87% of the overall debt in 2008, with a weighted 
average loan period of 67 months, and charge a 4.71% interest rate. Loans from governments 
and DFIs account only for 12% of the overall debt and charge an 8.27% interest rate (MIX 
2008). Funds charge the lowest rate (3.91%), which is subsidized. 
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2.2. Provisions for loan losses 
The borrowing rates differ according to the institutional status and operating areas of MFIs. 
On the one hand, banks usually grant a limited loan amount with respect to their status 
(Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 2008). In 2008, most MFIs in the sample (four out of five) are 
NGOs operating on mature microfinance markets: Egypt, Morocco and Jordan (Appendix 2): 
Despite their status, these MFIs have attracted donors and commercial lenders that charge 
low borrowing rates. On the other hand, commercial lenders do not wish to finance 
operations on the rural and agricultural markets. This led governments either to establish 
institutions and specialized rural credit programs with interest rates capped at artificially low 
levels, or to grant credit at concessional rates. Almost half the MFIs of the sample are 
involved in rural areas, especially in Egypt and Palestine, and taking advantage from 
subsidized rates (MIX & Sanabel, 2009). 
Most customers have no collateral and, as credits are not backed by real guarantees, MFIs 
incur a default risk. In as much as the loan portfolio generates interest income, the quality of 
loan repayment is essential for any MFI. The distinction between a good loan that is paid on 
time, and a risky loan that is late over (x) days from the due date, is paramount: the longer 
the delay, the higher the probability of default. The MFI can pass the non-performing loans 
(NPL) either on loss provisions when it is anticipated, or on losses when provisioned 
receivables become irrecoverable. The provision for NPL is a cost to the MFI, which reflects 
levels of loan delinquency and the value of actual losses during the period (Rosenberg et al. 
2013). 
The ratio of portfolio at risk (PAR (30)) measures the default risk, which is calculated by 
dividing the stock of all loans with arrears exceeding 30 days by the total outstanding loan 
portfolio (Appendix 1). Although MENA experiences the lowest PAR amongst all regions, it 
deteriorates over 2004-2011 in Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia (Figure 7). In 2008, Palestine 
and Syria record the highest PAR, due to political instability in both countries (Adair and 
Berguiga, 2010). The increase in Tunisia and Egypt reflects the negative impact of the "Arab 
Spring" on the microfinance sector. In Morocco, it is due to the absence of prudential 
standards and a credit bureau. In 2008, Moroccan MFIs recorded the highest ratio of 
provisions for NPL in the region (3.84%), ahead of Tunisia (1.88%) and Jordan (1.49%) 
(Figure 4 above). 
The ratio of risk coverage, the percentage of PAR covered by provisions for loan losses, fell 
in Morocco between 2008-2011 due to lack of funds: the average weighted PAR jumps from 
5% in 2008 to 17% in 2011; the rate of losses on NPL increased by 1% in 2007 to 12% in 
2009 (MIX & Sanabel, 2009). In 2008, less than half MFIs mainly grants joint guarantee 
loans: seven in Morocco and nine in Egypt (Appendix 2). Although such loans tend to tame 
the default risk with respect to individual loans (Armendariz and Morduch, 2005), the quality 
of the loan portfolio deteriorated for Moroccan and Egyptian MFIs: joint guarantee has 
proved insufficient to control the default risk. 
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Figure 7. Trends of the PAR across MENA countries (2004-2011) 
 
Legend: data are weighted means 
Source: our design 
 
2.3. Operating expenses 
The ratio of operating expenses measures the cost required to provide a loan unit, and 
depends on the productivity of staff and other operating costs (administrative burdens, 
branch network, transport, depreciation, etc.). The lower the ratio, the higher the efficiency 
of the MFI. Levels of MFI interest rates follow those of operating expense ratios (Figure 4 
above), which are the determining factor in lending rates. In 2008, the highest operating 
expense ratios for MENA MFIs are recorded in Yemen (35.43%), Morocco (27.3%) and 
Palestine (19.27%). 
The growth of MFIs can improve their efficiency by achieving economies of scale and 
expanding their loan portfolio, hence reducing the ratio of operating expenses. Such is the 
case for the mature markets of Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia, as well as Lebanon (Figure 4). 
However, such is not the case for MFIs in Morocco, although over two-thirds are mature 
(Appendix 2). The cost per borrower (CB) more than doubled between 2004 and 2011, while 
staff productivity (PP) fell from 220 borrowers per staff in 2006 to 118 in 2009; the increase 
in arrears has forced the personnel to devote more effort to loans recovery, at the expense of 
issuing new loans (MIX & Sanabel, 2010). 
In Palestine, the average loan amount per borrower based on gross national income (GNI) 
per capita (ALGNI) increases and the cost per borrower (CB) declines (Figure 8). However, 
MFIs remain inefficient and record the highest cost per borrower in the region ($ 304 in 
2011); staff manages individual loans with an average amount per borrower that exceeds the 
GNI per capita and earns almost seven times the loans income (MIX & Sanabel, 2011). 
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Figure 8.Average loan amount (as of GNI per capita) and cost per borrower in 
Palestine 
 
Source: our design from the MIX 
 
3. INTEREST RATES AND THE SOCIAL PERFORMANCE OF MFIS IN THE MENA 
REGION 
 
3.1. Methodology 
Yunus and Weber (2007) propose to restrict the lending rates to 10-15% points compared to 
the cost of financing for MFIs; this cap is designed to prevent MFIs to take excessive profits 
on loans to the poor (Gonzalez, 2011). Microcredit interest rates are evaluated according to 
the financial margin (interest rates premium), corresponding to the difference between 
lending rates and borrowing rates (cost of funds). The borrowing rate is calculated from 
dividing the financial burden by the average loan amount (AGLP) or total assets, in as much 
both ratios give similar results. Yunus and Weber (2007) rank MFIs into three categories 
(Box 2): the green zone includes those that target poverty, the yellow zone (intermediate but 
not defined) and the red zone includes MFIs that maximize their profits. This classification 
distinguishes MFIs whose clients are easy to serve from those whereof customers are more 
difficult to serve and whose operating costs per unit are the highest. The classification is due 
almost exclusively to the operating expenses, rather than profit levels, that amount to 80% of 
total expenditure covered by the financial margin for most MFIs. 
We study the relationship between lending rates and the social performance of MFIs in the 
MENA region, thanks to a (multivariate) cross-section analysis of 53 MENA MFIs in 2008. 
We use 12 variables to identify social performance and internal determinants of financial 
margin (Table 1). We design a typology that we compare to the classification of Yunus and 
Weber (2007). The latter proves unable to disentangle the MFIs that are not pro-poor from 
those whose interest rates are but usury. 
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Box 2: the classification of MFIs - pro-poor, intermediate and loan sharks 
Green zone: interest rate – cost of funds ≤ 10 percentage points. 
MFIs operating within this zone are termed as "pro-poor". 
Yellow zone: interest rate – cost of funds ≤ 15 percentage points.  
MFIs operating within this zone are termed as "intermediate". 
Red zone: interest rate – cost of funds> 15 percentage points.  
MFIs operating within this zone are termed as "loan-sharks". They are 
commercial firms whose main goal is to achieve large profit on behalf the 
shareholders and investors. 
Source: Yunus and Weber (2007) 
Table 1. Variables related to social performance and financial margin  
Code Terms Number Code Terms Number 
Social performance  
Women borrowers (3 categories) Depth of outreach (3 categories) 
FE1 0-50% (Low) 17 DEP1 Severely poor 31 
FE2 50-67% (More women) 12 DEP2 Poor 2 
FE3 67-100% (almost 
exclusively women) 
24 DEP3 Non-poor 20 
Financial margin 
Productivity of personnel (2 categories) Adjusted Return On Assets (2 categories) 
PP1 <118 (More productive) 27 ROAA1 < 0% (Non-profitable) 18 
PP2 >118 (Less productive) 26 ROAA2 > 0% (Profitable) 35 
Portfolio at risk (2 categories) 
PAR1 < 10% (Tolerable default 
rate) 
43 PAR2 > 10% (Excessive 
default rate) 
10 
Source: our design 
Social performance in 2008 is expressed by two variables proxies (Adair and Berguiga, 
2010): the social impact of MFIs (Depth of outreach) according to poverty lines ($ 1.25/ a 
day and $ 2/ a day), and the percentage of women borrowers (FE). 
The internal determinants of financial margin are operating expenses, provisions for losses 
and net profit (Figure 4 above), we respectively measured by the productivity of personnel 
(PP), the portfolio at risk 30 days (PAR (30)) and return on assets adjusted from subsidies 
(ROAA), which is calculated by Adair and Berguiga (2010). An MFI is considered more 
(less) productive when its productivity is above (below) the median; a PAR (30) below 
(above) 10% implies tolerable (excessive) delinquency rates; an ROAA standing above or 
below 0% indicates that the MFI is profitable or not profitable. 
 
3.2. Multivariate factor analysis and clustering of MFIs in 2008 
We restrict our factor analysis to the first two axes 1-2 that are most interpretable (Figure 9). 
Axis 1 opposes the PP1, PAR2 and ROAA1 terms to the PP2, PAR1 and ROAA2 terms; it 
can be interpreted as the axis of the financial margin components; it opposes MFIs whose 
financial margin is low to those whose margin is high. Axis 2, contrasting the FE1, DEP3 
and ROAA2 terms with the FE3, DEP1 and ROAA1 terms, distinguishes profitable and non-
socially performing MFIs, which target the non-poor and few women – from unprofitable 
and socially performing MFIs. 
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The interpretation of the relationship between financial margin and social performance from 
a clustering analysis outlines a typology of MFIs into four categories. 
Category 1 gathers 20 MFIs that are both socially effective and profitable; their financial 
margin is high: these MFIs that are pro-poor oriented have a positive impact on women 
(exclusive targeting), their default rate is very low and staff is very productive. Only three 
MFIs in this category (ARDI, INMAA and Finca-Jor) experience negative profitability 
although they have productive staff, and a less risky loan portfolio. These MFIs incur costs 
per borrower above the median ($ 74) because they grant small loans. Their high financial 
margin was not enough to cover their expenses. According to Gonzalez (2010) and Roberts 
(2013), it is operating expenses and not profitability that determine the financial margin of 
Category 1 MFIs. 
Category 2 identifies seven MFIs with high financial margin that are not socially effective, 
targeting non-poor women or poor men. 
Category 3 gathers 19 MFIs with low financial margin that are not socially effective. 
Category 4 identifies seven MFIs with low financial margin, albeit they are socially effective 
and profitable. However, the Yemeni MFI Azal did not cover expenses, despite its lending 
rate that is the highest in the region (58%) and a very low deposit rate (2.67%). It 
experiences a very high default rate (13.02%) and a non-productive staff; hence, it must 
increase efficiency rather than interest rates. 
Two-thirds (35 of 53) of our sample are profitable MFIs and over a half apply high lending 
rates above the median rate (31%). Almost half of these MFIs (16 of 35) appears in both 
categories 1 and 2: this suggests, on the one hand, that poor clients are able to afford high 
levels that do not prevent MFIs to achieve social performance. On the other hand, according 
to Roberts (2013), the profit motive encourages MFIs to set high lending rates. 
As regards category3, AMC and Makhazoumi are profitable MFIs, while they charge high 
lending rates of interest. Staff productivity is very low, 7.83 and 38 customers respectively 
per staff member. The AMC loan portfolio recorded a 12% delinquency rate. The application 
of a very high interest rate enabled these two MFIs to cover all their expenses and make a 
profit. 
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Figure 9. Axes 1-2: lending rates of interest and profitability of MENA 
MFIs (2008) 
  
Legend: 18 profitable MFIs whose lending interest rate is above the median rate 
Source: our design 
 
3.3. MENA typology versus the Yunus and Weber classification 
We place the MFIs from our typology into the classification designed by Yunus and Weber 
(2007); it comes out that over six out of seven MFIs fall within in the "red zone", whereof 
the financial margin is above 15%. Yunus and Weber assume financial performance is the 
main objective of these MFIs. However, our typology shows that these MFIs are included in 
all four categories and some do achieve social performance (Figure 10). 
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Figure 10. Axes 1-2 (MFIs): MENA typology vs. the Yunus and Weber 
classification 
 
Legend: green zone (6), yellow zone (2) and red zone (45) according to the Yunus and Weber 
classification 
Source: our design 
A 15% financial margin did not preclude MFIs in the "red zone" from targeting poor women. 
Some MFIs in Category 1 record low financial expenses, whereas others in Category 4 face 
high financial expenses with a less productive staff and an excessive default rate. 
Over one out of 10 MFIs in our sample are located in the "green zone" and belong to 
category 3. According to Yunus and Weber (2007), the main objective of MFIs in this zone 
is to targeting poor, albeit our typology shows they are generating but a small financial 
margin and target rather non-poor men. 
In the light of our typology, the Yunus and Weber classification is flawed. MFIs in the "red 
zone" may be socially effective as well as they can be non-profitable, whereas MFIs in the 
"green zone" are neither financially nor socially effective. Thresholds set by Yunus and 
Weber for the financial margin are irrelevant, and the financial margin as a criterion for 
ranking the orientation of an MFI proves inadequate. Hence, we must investigate the role of 
exogenous factors. 
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4. THE EXTERNAL FACTORS INFLUENCING INTEREST RATES IN THE MENA 
REGION 
4.1. Regulation 
MFIs need regulation in order to grow, particularly to access funds from banks and markets. 
In half the MENA countries, MFIs are regulated (Appendix 2); however, regulation varies 
across countries as well as from an institutional status to another (Adair and Berguiga, 2010). 
In Palestine and Lebanon, some MFIs depend upon the Home Office, whereas laws 
governing associations apply to NGOs, and laws for commercial or banking firms to NBFIs. 
Other countries (Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, Syria and Yemen) have enacted specific 
legislation for the microfinance industry that imposes a cap upon lending rates and prohibits 
deposit collection, which can affect the performance of MFIs. 
Capping the lending rate was adopted to facilitate the access of the poor to credit, and 
reducing the financial burden of the MFI. The cap upon interest rates applied only to Tunisia 
and Morocco in 2008; since then, it has been implemented in at least six MENA countries. 
According to our typology, the Tunisian MFI belongs to Category 1: capped rates have a 
positive impact on its social performance as well as its financial margin, enabling to cover its 
costs and ensure profitability. In Morocco, six out of 10 MFIs in categories 1 and 4 are 
socially effective: capped rates have a positive effect on social performance; however, six 
out of 10 Moroccan MFIs also fall in categories 1 and 2, whereof the latter is not socially 
effective. In Morocco and Tunisia, capped rates would allow MFIs to achieving high 
financial margin and be profitable. Moreover, do MFIs really comply with capped rates? It is 
difficult to know because the effective interest rates are not transparent. According MIX & 
Sanabel (2009), MFIs do not comply with capped rates and most bill higher interest rates 
(Pearce, 2011; MIX & Sanabel, 2012). 
Beyond its core credit business, an MFI can diversify its services with savings collection. 
Such collection is often restricted to banks or postal networks (MIX & Sanabel, 2010). 
MENA MFIs are prohibited to collect savings, except in Syria and Yemen. Yemen enacted a 
microfinance legislation in 2009. In Syria, a single law was devoted exclusively to 
microfinance by 2007; it authorizes the establishment of MFIs providing microfinance 
services, savings accounts and microinsurance (MIX & Sanabel, 2009). According to our 
typology, four of the five Yemeni MFIs included in category 4 are socially effective, 
whereas the Syrian MFIs included in Category 3 are socially inefficient (Figure 11). In both 
countries, MFIs achieve low financial margin; in as much as they collect (small) deposits, 
financial expenses rise due to the payment of interest as well as operational expenses 
because their staff is dedicated to savings management; however, customers seem to be 
faithful to their MFIs. 
4.2. Competition 
Market power is a major factor contributing to the high level of lending rates that is above 
those of commercial banks, especially for MFIs that often act as if they have a local 
monopoly (CGAP, 2001; McIntosh et al, 2005). Competition is increasing in the 
microfinance industry for many countries (Porteous, 2006). It should not only benefit 
consumers by offering them a wider choice of products and providers, but also requires from 
each MFI to lower its lending rates in order to remain competitive by reducing operating 
Performance of MFIs   
Éthique et économique/Ethics and Economics, 12(2), 2015   
http://ethique-economique.net/ 
 
59 
costs, thus increasing its effectiveness (Boye et al, 2008). The literature identifies various 
measures of competition: the concentration indexes (Herfindahl-Hirshman Index, bank 
concentration ratio) gauge competition in terms of numbers, whereas H-statistic and the 
Lerner index measure it in terms of degree. These measures were subject to criticism (Bikker 
and Haaf, 2002; Angelini and Ceterolli, 2003). 
Several proxies have been used to measure the intensity of competition in the microfinance 
industry. Such as the number or variation in the number of MFIs per country (McIntosh et al, 
2005; Hatarska and Nadolnyak, 2007), the percentage of borrowers in the adult population 
(Cotler and Almazan, 2013), the market share held by the four largest MFIs in a given 
country (Olivares-Polanco, 2005) and the Lerner index (Assefa et al, 2010). Competition is 
also measured for group lending MFIs, with respect to the presence, number and geographic 
distance with the competitors offering group loans (McIntosh et al, 2005). Cull et al (2009) 
apprehend competition at the country level rather than at institutional level: they gauge 
competition of MFIs vis-à-vis banks with penetration variables (number of branches per 
capita and density). The outcomes from these various ad hoc measurements of competition 
prove somehow difficult to compare. 
 
Table 2. Indicators of competition across MENA MFIs (2008) 
Source: our calculus from PovcalNet (2008) and the MIX (2008) 
Assuming there no other competitors, such as banks that exclude the poor and informal 
lenders, we examine three measurements of competition from the demand side among MFIs 
in the MENA region. First, the number and penetration rate of MFIs; second, the market 
share of the first two MFIs for every MENA country; and third, a weighted concentration 
effect that we design as the gap in the number of borrowers for every MENA country to the 
median number of borrowers (Appendix 1). 
MFIs (13) are quite a few in Egypt, but only 5.4% of the population below the $ 2 / a day 
poverty line access microfinance (Table 2): the rate of penetration is very low, albeit higher 
than in Yemen. Jordan has the highest penetration rate exceeding 100%, with seven MFIs 
that target both the poor as well as the non-poor: according to our typology, four of these 
MFIs listed in categories 2 and 3 are not socially effective (Figure 11). Hence, the 
penetration rate is not the best measurement for competition although it takes into account 
the demand side. 
Country Number 
of MFIs 
Rate of  
penetration 
Market share of the 
first two MFIs 
Gap to the weighted 
median 
Egypt 13 5.4% 39% 46.0582012 
Iraq 3 0.5% 96% 6.028 
Jordan 7 111.7% 54% 16.4115918 
Lebanon 3 - 98% 5.26177778 
Morocco 10 32.6% 64% 114.199578 
Palestine 8 54.1% 38.5% 2.9561875 
Syria 2 1.7% 100% 5.53725 
Tunisia 1 16.7% 100% 0 
Yemen 6 0.2% 56% 3.46888889 
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As regards market power, MFIs in Tunisia and Syria are respectively a monopoly and 
duopoly (Table 2). The Enda Tunisian MFI listed in category 1 requires a high 33% rate 
from its clients who are poor women. In contrast, the two Syrian MFIs from category 3 apply 
a very low interest rate: they are inefficient and did not use their market power to cover their 
costs with an increase in lending rates. Market power is important for the first two MFIs in 
Morocco and Jordan: respectively 64% and 54% of clients. MFIs in Egypt (13) and Palestine 
(8) compete: the first two MFIs gather respectively 39% and 38.5% of customers. Unlike 
Palestine, competition in Egypt has a positive impact on social performance and 
effectiveness of the MFIs, the majority is in category 1: they have a very productive staff, are 
targeting the poor and implement high interest rates (above the median), upon which 
competition has no impact. The competition indicator based on the market share of the first 
two MFIs thus drives to mixed conclusions. 
According to the effect of concentration, the higher the gap, the weaker is competition 
(Table 2). The outcomes confirm there is little competition in Morocco and Jordan, in tune 
with the market power index. However, the effect is also high in Egypt (46.05); which would 
imply the absence of competition, contrary to what the extent of market power suggested. 
 
Figure 11. Axes 1-2: MENA MFIs and country specific effect (2008) 
 
Legend: Egypt (E) 13 MFIs; Iraq (I) 3 MFIs; Jordan (J) 7 MFIs; Lebanon (L) 3 MFIs; 
Morocco (M)  
10 MFIs; Palestine (P) 8 MFIs; Syria (S) 2 MFIs; Tunisia (T) 1 MFI and Yemen (Y) 6 
MFIs. 
Source: our design 
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4.3. Inflation 
Inflation can be a significant barrier to the development of MFIs: the level of real interest 
rates does not only reduce the demand of the poor but also undermines the sustainability of 
microfinance. In the context of high inflation, real lending interest rate may become 
negative: MFIs must choose between negative real interest rates, which damage their loan 
portfolio, or nominal rates that cover inflation.  
The inflation rate in the MENA region in 2008 was very high in Yemen (18.97%), Egypt 
(18.31%), Syria (15.74%) and Jordan (14.92%); it had a different impact on the expense of 
(nominal and real) interest rate for MFIs in Jordan and Syria. In Syria, inflation triggered a 
negative real portfolio yield (-7%), the expense of nominal interest rate (7.45%) was far 
below the inflation rate (15.74%). Syrian MFIs as of Category 3 recorded very low financial 
margin and proved unprofitable; they were urged to increase their nominal interest rate to 
offset the increase in inflation after 2008. Given the same situation of rising inflation in 
2008, Jordan MFIs have set on average a 33% nominal interest rate, significantly higher 
(over the double) than the inflation rate, and benefited from a positive real interest rate 
(13.64%). Five of the seven MFIs as of categories 1 and 2 were able to achieve high 
financial margin to cover their expenses, including inflation and be profitable (Figure 11). 
CONCLUSION 
We study the lending interest rates of a panel of 66MFIs in the MENA region over the period 
2004-2012 in order to explain why they are set at high level. The examination of the internal 
components shows that operating costs are the main determinant of lending rates, followed 
by loss provisions and financial expenses. The financial margin that is included in the 
lending rate depends upon operating costs in the first place and not profitability. 
We design a multivariate factor analysis of 53 MFIs in 2008 focusing on the relationship 
between the financial margin and social performance. Most MFIs in the MENA region are 
profitable while applying a high interest rate that borrowers would be able to bear. From 
clustering analysis, we build a typology into four categories of MFIs that we compare to the 
three zones classification of Yunus and Weber (2007). The thresholds thereof are irrelevant 
and the choice of the financial margin as a guiding criterion of MFIs proves inadequate. 
Three other external factors affect the financial margin: competition among MFIs, 
regulations and inflation in the countries of the MENA region where they operate. The 
impact of competition on the lending rate and social performance differs according to 
measurements that do not match. Regulatory caps are set on lending rates and the collection 
of deposits is usually prohibited; most MFIs charge interest rates above caps and those 
collecting deposits seem to be socially effective. The rise in inflation has a negative effect 
upon the level of lending rates; hence, MFIs must often increase their rates to avoid 
deterioration of the loan portfolio. 
The setting of an adequate level for lending rates is critical for MFIs in the MENA region in 
order to be both competitive and profitable, while avoiding social mission drift. However, in 
the absence of transparent pricing (Microfinance Transparency, 2010), microfinance cannot 
develop as socially effective and financially sustainable because stakeholders (customers, 
regulators, donors, competing MFIs, etc.) cannot make informed decisions. 
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Our multivariate factor analysis focused on 2008, thanks to the availability of data and the 
outcomes of a previous study (Adair and Berguiga, 2010); however, it faces an inherent 
limitation to any cross-section approach. Thus, we will next use panel data analysis upon the 
microfinance interest rates in the MENA region. This should complement our research on 
the interactions between social performance and financial performance (Adair and Berguiga, 
2014), which is the heart of the microfinance issues. 
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Appendix1. Multivariate factor analysis: a dictionary of variables 
Variables Definitions Sources 
Depth of outreach 
(Depth) 
Comparison between poverty thresholds ($ 1.25 and $ 2/a 
day) according to Gross National Income per capita (GNI) 
and Average Loan per borrower according to GNI per capita 
(ALGNI) 
WDI, MIX, 
PovcalNet 
Loan size (ALGNI) Average Loan per borrower according to GNI per capita  
(Adjusted) Return On 
Assets (ROAA) 
Adjusted Operating Profit before subsisdies / Average Total 
Assets 
MIX, IMF 
(Nominal) lending 
interest rate 
Financial Revenue / Loan Portfolio MIX 
(Nominal) payable 
interest rate 
Financial expenses / Liabilities MIX 
Financial margin 
(premium) 
Portfolio performance – Cost of funds =  
Lending interest rate – Payable interest rate 
MIX 
Operating expense 
ratio 
Operating expenses/Average outstanding loans MIX 
Productivity of 
personnel (PP) 
Number of borrowers / Number of Staff MIX 
Portfolio At Risk 
(PAR) 
Portfolio At Risk >30 days / Loan Portfolio MIX 
Loan loss rate Amount written-off over the period / Outstanding value MIX 
Risk coverage ratio Provision for loan losses / PAR MIX 
Women Borrowers 
(FE) 
% of women borrowers MIX 
Regulation Qualitative (regulated vs.unregulated) MIX, 
CGAP 
Institutional status Qualitative (NGOs vs. other MFIs) MIX 
Gap to the weighted 
median 
Number of borrowers per country - median number of 
borrowers per country / Number of MFIs per country 
MIX 
Market share of the 
first two MFIs 
Total number of clients in the first two MFIs / Total number 
of clients in the country 
MIX 
Penetration rate Number of borrowers / Size of the population below the $ 2 
poverty line 
MIX, 
PovcalNet 
Source: authors 
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Appendix 2. Characteristics of the 53 IMF (2008) 
Legend: Egypt (E), Iraq (I), Jordan (J), Lebanon (L), Morroco (M), Palestine (P), Syria (S), Tunisia  
(T), Yemen (Y) 
Source: authors 
 
  E I J L M P S T Y Total 
Infant (<5 years) 3 3 2 0 1 2 1 0 4 16 
Young (5-8 years) 1 0 0 1 2 0 1 0 2 7 
Age 
Mature (> 8 years) 9 0 5 2 7 6 0 1 0 30 
Rural 6 0 2 1 5 5 2 0 0 21 Operating 
area Urban 7 3 5 2 5 3 0 1 4 30 
Joint-guarantee 9 0 3 0 7 1 0 0 4 24 Loan 
methodology Individual 4 3 4 3 3 7 2 1 2 29 
NGO 13 3 3 2 10 4 2 1 5 43 Institutional 
status Non NGO 0 0 4 1 0 4 0 0 1 10 
Regulated 0 1 2 1 10 5 0 1 0 20 Regulation 
regime Unregulated 13 2 5 2 0 3 2 0 6 33 
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